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PARENTAL SOCIALIZATION AND RATIONAL
PARTY IDENTIFICATION
Christopher H. Achen
This article constructs a rational choice model of the intergenerational transmission
of party identification. At a given time, identification with a party is the estimate of
average future benefits from candidates of that party. Experienced voters constantly
update this expectation using political events since the last realignment to predict the
future in accordance with Bayes Rule. New voters, however, have no experience of
their own. In Bayesian terms, they need prior beliefs. It turns out that under certain
specified conditions, these young voters should rationally choose to employ parental
experience to help orient themselves to politics. The resulting model predicts several
well–known features of political socialization, including the strong correlation be-
tween parents’ and children’s partisanship, the greater partisan independence of
young voters, and the tendency of partisan alignments to decay.
Key words: socialization; party identification; political parties; party systems; Bayesian;
retrospective voting.
All I know is we’re not Republicans. My father isn’t.—Judith, age 10
(Greenstein, 1969, p. 23)
INTRODUCTION
The predictive power of “party identification” in American elections is well-
nigh overwhelming, and, after some initial setbacks, evidence has accumulated
that, properly measured, it does well elsewhere, too (Converse and Pierce,
1985, 1986; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, 2002; Johnston, 1988; Miller
and Shanks, 1996; Shively, 1980). Partisanship remains the central factor in
explaining not just how people vote, but also how they see the political world,
just as Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes (1960/1980) asserted 40 years
ago and as sophisticated recent investigations have confirmed (Bartels, 2001b).
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The structuring power of partisanship in elections makes the study of parti-
san socialization important. As many scholars have noted, if every generation
began anew, democratic electorates would be less stable and more susceptible
to antisystem demagogues (for example, Easton and Dennis, 1969, chaps. 2,
3, 19). Longstanding party attachments inoculate citizens against overnight
new party movements, some of which may harbor potential totalitarians. Con-
verse (1964) pointed to weak partisanship, lacking the strength that builds up
over generations, as a contributing factor in Hitler’s rise to power via the
ballot box. Even historians with no ties to the “Michigan model” of party
identification have made a similar argument, noting particularly the weak
party ties of the German right in the electorate, many of whose voters Hitler
converted to his cause (Kershaw, 1983, pp. 25–26). Although the study of the
transmission of partisanship between generations has engaged only a few polit-
ical scientists, its intellectual importance is considerable. So far as contempo-
rary scholarship can determine, if Hitler matters, then so does the study of
partisan socialization.
Happily, partisanship in the electorate is well established for much of the
citizenry in most successful democracies, since most parents transmit their
party identification to their children. Though expressed partisanship is not
always meaningful among the very young (Greenstein, 1965, chap. 4; Hess
and Torney, 1968, pp. 103–104), careful longitudinal study of Americans has
shown that by adolescence, most children have a partisan identification con-
nected to political preferences in the same manner as adults, though not al-
ways as strongly. Among those children who have a partisan preference, nearly
all share it with their parents (Jennings and Niemi, 1981, pp. 89–91). Similar
findings generally hold in stable European democracies (see Sears, 1975 for a
review). These results are so familiar and well established that they are often
used as the explanatory axioms for topics as diverse as the growth of partisan-
ship in new electorates (Converse, 1969) and the origins of the American
gender gap in differential childhood socialization (Trevor, 1999).
Yet the very familiarity of parent–child partisan agreement has often let
parental success go unquestioned. The social-psychological tradition has too
often treated the child as the passive recipient of parental choices. But what
child was ever like that? Parents are rarely able to influence their teenage
children’s hairdos, clothing styles, tastes in popular music, or even more im-
portant decisions such as the choice of a life partner. Neither the trivial nor
the consequential seem to be under parental control. Why should party identi-
fication be any different? Put more precisely, why do teenagers implicitly ac-
cept their parents’ advice about political parties while they avoid taking it on
a great many other topics?
To answer these questions, and to help unify the main empirical findings
in the literature, this article constructs a rational choice model of political
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socialization. Here the child is no longer inert, but rather a decisionmaker
choosing what is best for its life. The assumptions are unabashedly individual-
istic, and the logic is strictly instrumental. Thus the goal of the model is not
detailed empirical veridicality, nor the explanation of every feature of partisan
socialization, but rather an accounting on the simplest possible basis for the
broad outlines of what we know about parental transmission of party identifi-
cation (PID) to children.
To accomplish this, first, the article sets out a stylized model of the flow of
party benefits to voters in a two-party system. The expected value of these
future benefits is identified with party identification. Next, a simple social
structure is postulated in which parents and children have correlated but not
identical positions, and these social positions influence party benefits. Thus
the electoral experience of children is correlated with that of their parents,
and so they can use parental experience to partially forecast their own future
experience. Finally, children’s optimal use of parental political experience is
derived and shown to account for some central stylized facts in the partisan
socialization literature.
PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND VOTING: THE ASSUMPTIONS
This section sets out a model of how voters decide. The perspective on
voting is the same as that of Achen (1992). Voters choose a party or candidate
when they believe that its future course of benefits exceeds that of the other
alternatives. When the voters expect that a party will favor them in the future,
they will be said to “identify” with that party. Of course, none of the emotional
or affective content sometimes associated with identification is treated here.
Those feelings are obviously quite real, but this model sets them aside in the
same way and for the same reason that economics sets aside the consumer’s
joy at finding a perfect apple in the grocery store.
The model treats voters as Bayesian prospective decisionmakers (forward-
looking and future-oriented), though with imperfect information. They use
past experience to predict the future because, under the assumptions, retro-
spection gives the best prospective forecast (Downs, 1957). Thus at a given
time, voters have a “standing decision,” but they are constantly modifying it
in light of events (Key, 1966).1 The voters’ use of this information is assumed
to be optimal in the Bayesian sense. The model builds on closely related
arguments and empirical support from Jackson (1975a, 1975b), Fiorina (1981,
ch. 5), Franklin and Jackson (1983), and Franklin (1984), and follows prior
Bayesian theorizing about voters by Zechman (1979) and Bartels (1983).
Within a given party alignment regime, it is assumed that a voter is offered
by each party a stream of benefits (cardinal utilities) that varies randomly
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around a constant mean. In a two-party system, only the difference between
the two offered streams matters to the vote choice.2 Subtract the second party
stream from the first, and let δ*i denote the mean difference for the ith voter,
assumed constant over time (until the next realignment): Then, denoting voter
i’s party difference in benefits at any given time t by uit:
uit = δ*i + vit (1)
where vit is normally distributed with mean zero, variance ω2i > 0, and is dis-
tributed independently over time. Thus benefits oscillate randomly around a
fixed personal mean δ*i for each voter, representing a stable world between
realignments in which the parties continue to stand for the same benefits over
time.3
From this simple dynamic model of Bayesian retrospective voting across
multiple elections, some of the best known findings of the voting literature
were derived. For example, it follows from the assumptions that partisans
will be better informed than Independents, that successful incumbents will
disproportionately attract young voters to their party, and that voters with
intermediate amounts of information will be the most likely to defect from
their party identification (Achen, 1992).
For analytic simplicity, the model ignores another feature of the political
world, Key’s (1959) “secular realignment,” in which realignment is continual
rather than intermittent. Thus for empirical purposes, greater realism would
be needed. One obvious way to model secular realignment and to meet the
demands of empirical work would be to generalize the white noise assumption
about vit, as was proposed in Achen (1992, p. 210). Gerber and Green (1998)
adopt this suggestion and take a useful step forward, replacing the white noise
ARMA(0,0) disturbances with an ARMA(1,0) form in order to do statistical
work.4 Bartels (2001b) goes further, adopting a very flexible model to assess
which functional forms describe voter updating. He finds that the data gener-
ally support the white noise assumption but, as he notes, this finding seems
implausible.
Learning the best functional forms for statistical models of Bayesian voter
updating is an important agenda item for students of public opinion. However,
tracking the empirical details, consequential as they are, is not the point of
this article. The goal instead is to use a stylized model to generate qualitative
predictions matching the main empirical generalizations.
SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND THE PARTIES: ASSUMPTIONS
From a rational choice perspective, a question that the social-psychological
literature has nearly always overlooked is the natural first one raised earlier:
Why should children decide to think like their parents? The answer given
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here is that parent and child will often occupy similar positions in the social
structure, and thus parental experience is likely to be relevant to the child’s
future adult life.
Proceeding in this way answers a question raised by virtually all the Bayes-
ian theoretical models used in political science, which include “subjective
prior information” as part of the voters’ conceptual machinery. The voters are
assumed to know something even before they acquire experience with the
political system. But how? Achen (1992) proposed to interpret this prior infor-
mation as parental socialization, but the rational choice foundation of that
view was laid out only informally. This section makes the logic explicit and
extends the findings of the earlier paper.
To formalize the intuition, a simplified social world is now constructed in
which each parent and each child is characterized by a vector of social attri-
butes, normally distributed over the population, which influence the flow of
party benefits. Thus voter i’s position in the social structure is characterized
by an k-dimensional (row) vector si, fixed over time and exogenous with re-
spect to party benefits, whose elements may customarily be thought of as her
income, social status, religious preferences, and so on.5 This list of the voter’s
politically relevant personal characteristics will be called her “social position.”
Thus, a variable is part of the voter’s social position if it affects her flow of
benefits from the political parties but is causally prior to them.6
The party benefit differential for each voter is assumed to be a linear func-
tion of her social position. For example, a party might offer more benefits to
those with higher incomes or evangelical Protestant beliefs, and the effects
might be additive. Of course, party benefits are influenced by many kinds of
ideological, attitudinal, and other factors not included in the voter’s social
position, all involved in complex causal interrelationships with party identifica-
tion. Such effects are not ignored or assumed away here, but rather mathemat-
ically converted to their dependence on predetermined factors. In economet-
ric terms, the relationship between social position and party benefits is a
“reduced form,” combining in the standard way the direct effects of the social
variables with their indirect effects through other endogenous variables.
Recalling that δ*i represents voter i’s mean difference in party benefits, we
have:
δ*i = α + siβ (2)
where the scalar α and the vector β are parameters fixed across individuals.7
In practice, of course, some actual voters will know, perhaps from an early
age, that their party benefits will relate to their social situation or their parents’
social situations in atypical ways, and they will follow a somewhat different
law. But again, the goal of this article is to predict aggregate features of the
socialization process using the average behavior of the population, not to
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model every individual. Anyone who uses ordinary regression models with
their fixed coefficients has adopted the same procedure.
The intercept term α in (2) allows one party to offer greater benefits on
average than the other. For example, young voters in a frozen political system
might favor a party of the Left to improve their life prospects, or a party of the
Right to restore peace and quiet after a tumultuous era. To simplify matters, α
will be assumed known.8 In that case, voters may as well focus on δi = δ*i − α,
and this paper will do so as well.
Then from Equation (2), we obviously have:
δi = siβ (3)
For ease of exposition, δi will be referred to as the “party differential” in
benefit streams, although that phrase more properly applies to δi + α.
Now, to determine the aggregate distribution of party benefits, assumptions
are made about the distribution of the social position vector si across the
population of voters. It is taken to be multivariate normally distributed in each
generation. Thus if parental social position is denoted by sp, that of their chil-
dren by sc, and if the stacked vector of parents and child is s = (sp sc), then it
is assumed that:
s  N(µ, Σ) (4)
where µ = (µ1 µ2) is the 2k-dimensional mean vector and Σ is the joint vari-
ance–covariance matrix, assumed positive definite. Thus in particular, the up-
per-left k × k submatrix Σ1 is the variance–covariance matrix for the parents,
and the analogous lower-right submatrix Σ2 that of the children. The positive–
definiteness assumption means that no dimension of the child’s social position
can be perfectly forecast knowing only the parents’ social position, and vice
versa. Since the scales are arbitrary, one may set µ1 = µ2 = 0 and Σ1 = Σ2 = Σs.
The square off diagonal submatrices Σ12 = Σ′21 give the covariance matrix
between sp and sc. They will be assumed positive–definite; this is the multivari-
ate version of the assumption that parents and children have positively corre-
lated but not identical social positions.9
These assumptions about si imply from Equation (3) that δi has a normal
distribution across the population. Moreover, since cardinal utilities are
unique only up to a linear transformation, one may scale δi to have unit vari-
ance, so that β′Σsβ = 1. Thus δi is standard normal.
Now the multivariate normality assumption of Equation (4) implies that
parents transmit their social position, sp, to their children, sc, according to a
linear law. That is, each element of the child’s social position is a linear func-
tion of all the elements of its parents’ social position:
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sc = spR + w (5)
where Equation (5) is a “seemingly unrelated regressions” formulation with
identical independent variables in each regression, the matrix of regression
coefficients is R = Σs−1Σ12 by the usual least squares formulas, and w is a multi-
variate normally distributed disturbance with mean zero and variance matrix
Σs − R′ΣsR.10 The main diagonal elements of R will be assumed strictly positive.
That is, parents’ and children’s corresponding elements in their social posi-
tions are positively correlated.
One may get a little intuition about this relationship by noting that R′R is
just the squared correlation matrix between elements of sp and elements of sc.
Thus for example, in the one-dimensional case, sp and sc might represent just
social class. Then R in Equation (5) would be a single regression coefficient,
and it would equal the correlation coefficient between the social class of par-
ents and their children.11
PARENTS, CHILDREN, AND THE PARTIES
To see how social structure and party benefits are transmitted from parent
to child, begin with Equation (3). There, the voter’s party benefit differential
depends on her social position. Applying this to the case of the child gives:
δc = scβ (6)
Next, substituting for sc from the social transmission Equation (5) gives the
relation between the child’s party benefits and parental social position:
δc = (spR + w)β (7)
Now, voters are assumed to be generally unaware of all this social structure.
They are ignorant of the social transmission process, their own and their par-
ents’ social position vectors, and the true values of their own and their parents’
expected benefit streams. Thus the child cannot use Equation (7) directly to
forecast future benefits.12 However, it is possible for the child to learn how
parental experience with the parties, δp, correlates with the child’s future ben-
efits, δc. Since the parents’ benefits depend on their social position according
to δp = spβ, the covariance between δp and δc is, using Equations (5) and (7):
E(δ′pδc) = E(β′s′pspRβ) + E(β′s′pwβ) (8)
But β is fixed and sp and w are uncorrelated from Equation (5), so that the
last term is zero.
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Now one may solve for the correlation between mean parental party bene-
fits δp and their children’s future benefits δc. Call this correlation ρ.13 Then,
using the previous equation, along with the fact that the variance–covariance
matrix of sp is Σs:
cov(δp,δc) ≡ ρ
= β′ΣsRβ (9)
It is easily shown that under the assumptions of this article, ρ > 0, that is,
children tend to have experiences with the political parties similar to those of
their parents. However, the correlation is imperfect and children cannot sim-
ply copy their parents: ρ < 1.14
Now we may spell out the predictive relationship between the child’s expe-
rience with the parties and that of its parents. Using Equation (9), since all
variables are normally distributed, we have:
δc = ρδp + wβ (10)
This is a decomposition of the voter’s expected benefit stream from the par-
ties, δc. The first part is her expected benefit stream due to her partial inheri-
tance of the social position of her parents and thus her correlation with the
party benefits δp they experience during their lifetime. The second part is that
due to her unanticipated difference in social position from that of her parents.
It may be useful here to summarize all the basic assumptions that led to
Equation (10). First, parent and child positions in the social structure are
normally distributed and hence linearly related with an error term. Second,
for both the child and the parents, mean experience with the parties is linearly
related to their social position. Third, for both children and parents, each
period’s experience with the parties equals their mean experience plus a nor-
mally distributed error term. Hence by standard Bayesian logic, if children
know their parents’ PID, they can forecast their own by adopting their par-
ents’ PID but then regressing it somewhat toward 0, that is, toward lesser
partisanship.15 That is the content of Equation (10).
As already mentioned, the voters are assumed to know very little. However,
they do know something. Concretely, they know only that if their parents
disliked Republicans, then it is likely, but not certain, that their experience in
adulthood with the GOP will be negative, too. This substantive assumption is
embodied in the model’s assumption that the voters know Equation (10), and
they know ρ. These two bits of statistical knowledge make it possible to use
parental experience as an guide on entering political adulthood. Of course,
the voters need not literally know the model and the value of its parameter
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for them to behave in the qualitative manner it describes, anymore than tennis
players returning serve need to know the differential equations describing the
flight of tennis balls. To validate the assumption, voters need only treat paren-
tal PID as a helpful but not infallible guide for themselves.
As it stands, however, Equation (10) is useless to the child. It relates the
true long-term PIDs of parents and children to each other, neither of which
will ever be known. Parents do not live forever, and even if they did, party
alignments do not persist indefinitely. Hence children must make do with
what their parents have learned thus far.
The child copes with this limitation in the following way. At time 0, the
voter is a young adult just entering the political system and considering her
future within it. For many, this step occurs when they first become eligible to
vote, though of course it may occur somewhat earlier or later as well.16 She
has no experience with the party system herself and hence no direct evidence
of its mean benefit difference for her, δc. However, she knows Equation (10)
plus her parents’ mean flow of benefits since the last realignment, namely
ūp0.The parents’ current estimate of their mean benefits (their current PID)
may be written as:
ūp0 = δp + εp0
(11)
where εp0  N(0,σ 2p0).17 Note that the normality of εp0 follows from that of uit
in Equation (1).
With this structure, a new voter (the “child” in the socialization literature,
but actually a teenager) is ready to make a rational choice of her party identifi-
cation. To make the logic explicit, note that since ūp0 is an estimate of δp, the
new voter may substitute it for δp on the right-hand side of equation (9) to
produce a forecast for her own δc. This is a bivariate regression setup with
errors in the independent variable. Since all variables are normally distributed,
the optimal forecast is given by ordinary least squares formulas. The initial
party identification is just the forecast of δc at time 0. Denoting it by δ̂c0,




where by the usual formula for attenuation of the slope, λ = 1/(1 + σ 2p0), which
is (true variance of δp)/(true variance + error variance). The parameter λ mea-
sures the reliability of party benefits: When the parties dependably deliver
approximately the same benefit level each period, λ nears 1.0. When benefits
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are highly erratic and undependable, λ approaches 0. In the latter case, par-
ents will be less sure about their PID, and their children should rely less on
their parents, as Equation (12) implies.
The new voter’s forecast variance for her party benefits is easily seen to be
1 − ρ2λ2(1 + σ 2p0) = 1 − ρ2λ. Put another way, at time 0 the child is not entirely
certain about her future experience with the parties, but she has expectations
that allow for some uncertainty, expressed as a statistical distribution. The
posterior distribution for her mean future benefit stream is distributed as
N(δ̂c0, 1 − ρ2λ).
With this structure, several different concepts of party identification can be
given explicit definition. Kramer (1987) argued that too many important politi-
cal science concepts have only an intuitive meaning; “party identification” is
an outstanding example. Traditionally the concept is defined only infor-
mally—as an “attitude.” In practice, it is most often identified with the answer
to an opinion survey question, and the inevitable debates about wording and
cross–cultural equivalence have ensued.
In this article, the term “current party identification” of voter i will refer
precisely to δ̂i0 (and its updated estimates in subsequent periods, δ̂in). The
constant δi, to which δ̂in tends, will be called the “long–term party identifica-
tion.” This distinction makes it clear how a voter can have simultaneously a
stable PID to which she tends to return and also another PID that she is
constantly revising and updating in response to contemporary events. It also
suggests that in two–party systems, PID can be thought of as a three-dimen-
sional quantity—estimated mean benefit level from Democrats, estimated
mean benefit level from Republicans, and the variance or uncertainty in these
estimates (compare Weisberg, 1980).
The Michigan survey response is yet another quantity, reflecting current
PID plus the usual survey noise. (Dramatic examples of how differently peo-
ple interpret the usual questionnaire items about partisanship appear in Flani-
gan, Rahn, and Zingale, 1989.) For purposes of verification, students of voting
have little alternative to using the survey responses about partisanship as prox-
ies for the theoretical quantities, and this article will follow in that tradition.
Happily, PID is among our best measured and most reliable concepts, and
so the problem is minimized here. But it bears emphasizing that the formal
propositions of this article refer to the variables as defined by the theory, not
to less reliable survey research operationalizations of precise concepts such as
“prospective evaluations” or “perceived party benefits.” For understandable
reasons, surveys rarely tie their questions to the strict meaning theory gives
them, and respondents often respond with something else entirely. For that
reason, when such variables seem to contradict the implications of a formal
theory but accuracy of measurement is not assessed, survey noise is always a
very credible alternative explanation (compare Gerber and Green, 1998, pp.
798–801).
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THE MAIN EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS
With the model of the previous section in hand, several propositions famil-
iar from the political socialization literature emerge immediately, as do several
other empirical implications.18 Before turning to them, however, a preliminary
result is needed.
The first proposition compares the initial PID of new voters to that of their
parents. To make that comparison, the parents’ current PID is needed. The
same calculations used for the new voter may be applied to the parents to
give the parents’ current best estimate:
δ̂p0 = λūp0 (13)
with posterior variance 1 − λ.19
With this result, the first proposition can be stated:
Proposition 1. New voters’ current PIDs are initially positively correlated with that
of their parents but more centrist: cov(δ̂p, δ̂c0) > 0 and *δ̂p* > *δ̂c0*.
Proof. Using the above Equations (12) and (13), and 0 < ρ < 1: *δ̂p0* = *λūp0* >
ρ*λūp0* = *ρλūp0* = δ̂c0*.
Thus young voters tend to have their parents’ party identifications, but as a
group, they are Independents more often than their elders. Evidence for this
proposition in the United States appears in Jennings and Niemi (1981, pp.
90–91, 153). Note again that “centrist” here means “toward the middle of the
distribution”: new voters regress toward the population average of the party
differentials, which need not be 0. Thus, in an era of Democratic PID advan-
tage, initial PIDs will be a compromise between parental PID and a mild
Democratic tendency, as the Jennings-Niemi data show.
Notice also that Proposition 1 refers to a rather abstract class of people—
young voters who know absolutely nothing of the political world except their
parents’ PID. The Proposition implies that among these idealized young vot-
ers just at the exact moment before they begin to learn on their own, some
might be Independents, but absolutely none of them will have the opposite
partisanship from their parents. Testing such a claim with survey data is obvi-
ously impossible, and not of much importance in any case.
In what sense, then, might the Proposition be validated? It is important to
remember that surveys of young voters do not reach them at the moment they
enter the political system in a state of complete innocence apart from parental
preferences, if indeed such a state exists. Instead, actual young voters have
often moved beyond the Proposition’s semifictional time 0, meaning that they
possess varying amounts of experience and knowledge of the political system.
In that case, if Proposition 1 is correct, then a corollary can be proved (though
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at greater length and with less transparency than the Proposition). On average,
new voters will have begun to move toward their mature PID, but from a
starting point of Independence or agreement with parental PID. Thus, most
young voters will have their parents’ PID or none at all, either because they
have not yet given much thought to politics or because they are finding that
their adult political preferences match that of their parents. However, a mi-
nority of new voters will have acquired enough initial experience to deviate
from their parents and adopt the opposing partisanship. The corollary predicts
some strict opposition to parental PID, but not much. That is, of course, just
what the data show.
Thus the Proposition’s qualitative forecasts—strong agreement between
parent and child, but more Independents among children—are matched by
the data, even though its precise predictions are untestable. A corollary to the
Proposition also makes the same qualitative predictions, is directly testable,
and is confirmed. It is in these senses that the Proposition is confirmed. Simi-
lar remarks refer to all the succeeding Propositions in which new voters play
a role.
Proposition 2. New voters’ current PIDs are initially more labile (higher subjective
variance of estimate) than their parents.
Proof. The new voters’ variance is 1 − ρ2λ; that of parents is 1 − λ; λ > 0; the conclu-
sion follows.
For suggestive evidence in the American context, see Jennings and Niemi
(1981: 50–51), where strength of PID is shown to be lower for young adults
than for their parents.
Proposition 3. New voters with more labile parents have more labile PIDs; they
will also have more centrist PIDs than other new voters whose parents have the
same mean experience with the parties: if p and c denote one parent–child combina-
tion and p′ and c′ another, then ūp0 = ūp′0 and σp0 > σp′0 implies both 1 − ρ2λp > 1 −
ρ2λp′ and *δ̂c0* < δ̂c′0*.
Proof. By definition, λp = 1/(1 + σp0), and similarly for λp′. Hence σp0 > σp′0 implies
λp < λp′. In combination with ρ > 0, this clearly implies the inequality on the poste-
rior variances. Finally, note that since *δ̂c0* = ρλpūp0 and similarly for *δ̂c′0*, the in-
equality on the λ’s immediately implies, in combination with ūp0 = ūp′0 and ρ, λp,
λp′ > 0, that *δ̂c0* < *δ̂c′0*.
There does not seem to be a direct assessment of Proposition 3 in the
literature. Rough tests appear in Campbell et al. (1960/1980, p. 147), who use
respondents’ reports of their parents to show that, controlled for parental PID,
those raised in less “politically active” homes have more centrist PIDs. Simi-
larly, Jennings and Niemi (1981, pp. 86–87) use parents’ and children’s own
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reports to demonstrate that the children of politically poorly informed parents
tend to be poorly informed.
Proposition 4. All else equal, the more limited or more erratic the political experi-
ence of the parental generation (smaller λ), the more centrist (Independent) the
initial PIDs of young voters will be.
Proof. Obvious from Equation (12). See the discussion there for additional remarks
and interpretation.
This is the standard explanation for the low levels of partisanship found in
Germany, France, and Italy in the immediate decades after World War II
(Sears, 1975, pp. 120–121). Fascist interludes and regime change make paren-
tal political experience thin, less reliable, and thus less relevant to new genera-
tions. Hence the young tend to disregard their parents.20
Proposition 5. All else equal, the greater the changes in party policy across genera-
tions (smaller ρ, meaning that similar people in different generations receive dissimilar
benefits), the more centrist (Independent) the initial PIDs of young voters will be.
Proof. Again obvious from Equation (12).
Any factor that reduces the correlation between party benefits to similar
people in different generations, such as social mobility, will have the same
effect:
Corollary. All else equal, greater social mobility (an attentuated main diagonal ele-
ment in R) induces more centrist (Independent) PIDs among young voters.
Proof. The relationship between the social position of parents and that of children
is given by the matrix R in Equation (5). When it is a scalar, Equation (9) obviously
implies that a smaller R produces a smaller ρ, so that by Proposition 5, the result is
proved. With a bit more work using partitioned matrices, it may be shown that the
same is true if one main diagonal element of R is reduced in magnitude.
To my knowledge, the hypotheses just stated in the Proposition and its
Corollary have never been investigated.
In a different interpretation, Proposition 5 also explains why teenagers ig-
nore parental advice about haircuts and popular music. On topics like these,
parental experience is a very poor predictor of what the next generation will
find attractive. Those aspects of social position that predict such preferences
are poorly correlated over generations, inducing a small ρ. Hence teenagers
sensibly pay their parents no mind.
Proposition 6. Large party benefits at a given time period have effects that are
transmitted across generations but die out over time.
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Proof. A one-time shock g in the parental generation raises their experience of party
benefits when their children come of age, ūp0, by the amount g/n, where n is the
number of elections experienced by the parents.21 By Equation (12), the extra quan-
tity ρλg/n is then transmitted to their children. The succeeding generation will then
be transmitted the extra amount ρ2λ2g/n2, and so forth. Since both ρ and λ are
strictly bounded between zero and one, the Proposition follows.
The literature on realignments and their subsequent decay provides broad
support for this proposition. Beck (1979) in particular discusses the cyclical
pattern of American electoral politics, in which the initial shock of a realign-
ment gradually wears off and new alignments become possible. As he notes,
a simple possible explanation for the cycle is that the generations pass and
children forget their grandparents’ lives, making subsequent generations avail-
able for recruitment to new party structures. Unfortunately, careful empirical
testing of this proposition appears nearly impossible.
For the final result, an additional variable is needed. This variable is “affec-
tive warmth” or “closeness” between parent and child. Denote it by apc. Expe-
rience suggests that this variable is not much related to demographic similari-
ties between parent and child such as gender, occupation, or religious beliefs.
Some parent–child pairs love each other deeply, most care a great deal about
each other, and a few are oil and water, but in all these cases it is rare for
there to be much impact on the child’s choice of occupation or lifestyle.
For the purposes of this article, no soundings of these depths is required.
We need only assume that once we have predicted the child’s social position
sc from the parental social position sp, their closeness apc adds no explanatory
power:
E(sc*sp, apc) = E(sc*sp) (14)
This is obviously only an approximation, but probably a good one. For ex-
ample, children with lawyer parents are more likely to wind up as attorneys
than other children: That correlation is embedded in the equation. What the
equation adds is an assumption that the correlation does not increase when
the children love their attorney parents deeply. Indeed, most well-loved chil-
dren of attorneys are not attorneys.
The assumption in Equation (14) has a strong consequence very much in
contrast to the traditional social-psychological theories of socialization. Be-
cause Equation (14) is speculative, this implication will be labeled a conjec-
ture:
Conjecture. Affective closeness between parents and children has no effects on the
socialization of partisanship. In particular, the children of close relationships are no
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more likely to share their parents’ PID than are the children of less close relation-
ships who are similarly placed in the social structure.
Proof. By Equation (3), party benefits depend only on social position, so that par-
ents and children have correlated party benefits only because their social positions
are correlated. By the assumption in Equation (14), affective closeness adds nothing
additional to the prediction of the child’s social position or future party benefits.
Thus in Equations (10) and (12), this new variable will be ignored. Hence the previ-
ous logic and results hold in all detail whether or not the child is close to the parents,
as the Conjecture states.
Closeness to parents as a cause of political socialization has been studied
from time to time. Its effects have usually turned out to be small or erratic
(see the review in Sears, 1975, p. 126), much to the researchers’ surprise. If
the assumption in Equation (14) holds, however, the weak effects are natural.
The warmth of family relationships does not keep family members from ignor-
ing useless advice.22
This result, so surprising from the social-psychological perspective, is one
more reason why the rational choice viewpoint is helpful. Treating the teenage
child as a thinking being and asking why the child should adopt the parents’
views puts the emphasis on those parental preferences and relationships that
are likely to be helpful to the child in future. In turn, that sorts out the factors
likely to be influential in socialization from those that are not. The older litera-
ture tended to treat the child as a much-loved vessel into which parents
poured their values. In consequence, it relied on a different set of explantory
variables, more affective and less instrumental. Thus a careful empirical test
of the importance of parent–child closeness in partisan socialization would
help sort out the relative contributions of rational choice and social-psycholog-
ical perspectives to the understanding of political socialization.
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
This article has set out a very simple rational choice model for parental
socialization of children’s party identification. The model is closely integrated
with previous Bayesian models of party identification, the effects of political
campaigns, and vote choice. The various Bayesian models imply the key quali-
tative findings of the social-psychological school.
With respect to partisan socialization in particular, this article assumed that
children will have adult social positions correlated with that of their parents
and that social positions are related to benefits received from political parties
(party identification). Hence new voters behaving according to standard Bayes-
ian logic can learn something of their own future benefits by knowing the
experience of their parents and then as they get more experience, they can
update their PID. Several standard findings of the behavioral literature were
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derived from this framework, including the tendency of young voters to have
the same identification as their parents, the greater proportion of Indepen-
dents among young voters, the low levels of partisanship found in political
systems after dictatorial interludes, and the tendency of party alignments to
decay. Thus by deriving the central empirical generalizations in the literature,
Bayesian voter theory both explains why they typically hold and suggests con-
ditions under which the axioms might fail and the generalizations not apply.
This theoretical success raises a puzzle. For 50 years, a decent respect for
social science evidence (or just walking a precinct) has compelled social scien-
tists to the view that Bayesian updating is not a good empirical description of
voter decisionmaking. Yet without any need for ad hockeries or “adjustment”
of assumptions, the simplest possible Bayesian models generate strong, nonob-
vious, but well-verified logical implications across the entire field of voting
behavior, including the study of socialization. How can this be so?
Three forces seem to be at work. First, the great majority of the evidence
cited in this article refers to studies of population or subpopulation averages.
Often these averages are the only socially relevant outcomes. But then, as long
as the average voter responds correctly, the data will look as though everyone
did. The fact that the model is rather poor at the individual level may make
almost no difference for purposes of social explanation. A large group covers
a multitude of inferential sins.
Second, the voter is rarely alone when making decisions. Interest groups,
politically aware family members and friends, and the media all spend time
telling her what she should be thinking, and many of them have the resources
to update their estimates with great care. If the voter knows only enough to
listen to people whose basic political interests resemble her own, she may
once again behave as if she were a Bayesian updater even though in fact she
knows none of the relevant information. Thus individualist logic often nicely
mimics more complex social processes while bypassing the formidable de-
mands of modeling them accurately.
Third and finally, the fundamental Bayesian logic is qualitatively robust
against certain kinds of errors. Consider the result sometimes found in deci-
sionmaking studies, in which the voter is a “conservative Bayesian”: for exam-
ple, she might make use of her parental PID, but not as strongly as the social
structure demands. Thus in Equation (12), she may use “too small” a weight-
ing factor ρ*, say, where ρ* < ρ. Modifying Equation (12) accordingly then
gives:
δ̂c0 = ρ*λūp0 (15)
The above equation describes an inept Bayesian. However, in a slightly
different world in which party benefits were less correlated across generations
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(that is, where ρ* were the true value rather than a mistake), the equation
would describe a flawless Bayesian. All the same qualitative findings given in
the Propositions would hold either way. Since the underlying parameters are
unknown and perhaps unknowable, the distinction is irrelevant. There is no
way to tell which world we are in, and it makes no qualitative difference. Since
qualitative predictions and not quantitative data fitting is the point of the
model, this particular failure of rationality, which looms so large in the social-
psychological literature, has essentially no empirical consequences.23 In short,
there is reason to expect that, given appropriate auxiliary assumptions, a Bayes-
ian approach to formal modeling of voter choice will often work very well,
especially for aggregate predictions, in spite of somewhat inaccurate assump-
tions.
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NOTES
1. Bayesian models often allow the voter to incorporate current campaign information into PID
as well. Voters clearly do so, an effect visible in survey responses. This short-term volatility
is irrelevant to the study of socialization, which focuses on long-term effects. However, the
distinction is worth remembering when assessing socialization models using a survey like the
American National Election Study (NES), which is carried out during election campaigns.
2. The extension to the more usual case of multiple parties is essentially straightforward, al-
though the arithmetic becomes heavier, since multidimensional measures of PID are re-
quired.
3. Throughout this article, the model will be interpreted as applying to national politics, where
nearly all partisan socialization research has been focused. However, a voter might have dif-
ferent party benefit streams from national, state, and local politics, and thus have party identi-
fications that vary across levels. Canada is the outstanding example.
4. Oddly, Gerber and Green (1998) treat their statistically oriented model as competing with
the stylized setup in Achen (1992), where the white noise model was explicitly set out as a
“special case” and an example of “crude models” (pp. 202, 209) built for theoretical clout.
No position was taken there about the correct empirical ARMA specification, and statistical
exploration like Gerber and Green’s was encouraged.
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5. Since women are the majority, I will refer to voters most often as “she.”
6. Naturally, “social position” is defined relative to a time, place, and sociopolitical system. It is
easy to think of situations in which the demographic and occupational variables routinely
treated as exogenous in our regression equations would instead be driven by politics and
would therefore be endogenous. Thus different political systems will have different variables
included in voter social positions.
7. Readers who would prefer a disturbance term in this equation may simply interpret the last
element of si as the disturbance and set the last element of β to one. Under the usual inde-
pendence conditions on disturbances, this stochastic formulation is actually less general than
the seemingly more restrictive deterministic setup in Equation (2).
8. This assumption would require American voters to know how often the Democrats or the
Republicans win (since electoral outcomes are determined by the balance of party benefits
α). For greater realism, voter uncertainty about this parameter could be incorporated into
the model in the standard Bayesian manner, although at the cost of considerable clutter and
no important changes in the substantive findings.
9. Note that there is exactly one parent per child; “parents” are treated here as if they were a
single person or an average. This is an obvious oversimplification, but it seems hopeless to
model in full detail the tag-team socialization of contemporary American children.
10. The inverse Σs−1 required to define R exists because Σ is positive definite and hence of full
rank 2k. Thus its principal diagonal square submatrices such as Σs are also of full rank and
have an inverse.
11. Notice that discrete variables like gender are not normally distributed, and minor modifica-
tions to the model would be required to incorporate their political effects.
12. The argument of this article would be little changed if children were aware of their parents’
(multidimensional) social position and knew how all its components combined to generate
party identification. Essentially, children would then have several noisy predictors of their
own partisanship rather than just parental PID, but the fundamental Bayesian logic would
be unaltered, and the qualitative results of this paper would remain unaltered.
13. Note that since δp and δc are both standard normal, their covariance ρ is also their correlation
coefficient.
14. The strict non-negativity of ρ holds because ρ = β′ΣsRβ = β′Σ12β, and Σ12 is positive–definite
by assumption, so that ρ > 0. On the other hand, ρ < 1. To see that, let the stacked 2k-
dimensional vector β*′ = (β′ − β′) and consider the quadratic form β*′Σβ*. Since Σ is posi-
tive–definite, the latter term is strictly positive. Simple partitioned matrix multiplication gives
its value as 2β′Σsβ − 2β′Σ12β = 2 − 2ρ by the discussion below Equation (3) and by the previ-
ous paragraph. But since 2 − 2ρ must be strictly positive, then ρ < 1.
15. More precisely, in forming their initial PID, children should regress their parents’ partisanship
toward the average partisanship α of the population. This may not be near the 0 (neutral) point
between the parties in some time periods. See the discussion earlier of Equations (2) and (3).
16. As one reviewer correctly pointed out, the 10-year old quoted at the beginning of the article
is surely outside the model, with her short-term fate tied more closely to her parents than is
the case for the new voters to which the model is directed. However, the logic of the article
would need only a slight extension to cover that case. It would imply greater parent–child
agreement among 10-year olds than among 18-year olds. The literature cited at the beginning
of this article will confirm that prediction, as will anyone who has lived with children of both
ages.
17. The parents’ current estimate of party benefits actually includes some prior information based
on the experience of their parents (the child’s grandparents), which complicates the logic
slightly without affecting the conclusions. For simplicity, that feature of parental PID is ig-
nored here. The model’s full logic is given in Achen (1992).
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18. The first three were set out without proof in Achen (1992, p. 205).
19. Note that parental PIDs are not just the raw average of their experiences, ūp0. Instead, their
PIDs are regressed to the population mean via the parameter λ, due to the existence of prior
information about the distribution of δi. The same logic explains the appearance of λ in the
equation for the child’s initial PID, Equation (12).
20. Strictly speaking, the proposition relates only to changes in λ, which is driven by the variabil-
ity in the voter’s party benefits in Equation (1). Regime changes and undemocratic intervals
would modify other aspects of the model as well, but the argument in these more dramatic
cases would be similar.
21. Actually the divisor is slightly larger, due to the prior transmitted by the grandparents’ genera-
tion (Achen, 1992), but that makes no difference here.
22. Of course, it is not hard to think of situations in which the effects would be stronger. The
point is that a variable should influence the new voter’s partisanship only when it predicts
her future relationship to the political system.
23. Of course, precisely the same argument applies to a “liberal Bayesian” with ρ* > ρ.
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